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Dennis: An Annotated List of Major Historic Preservation Court Decisions

AN ANNOTATED LIST OF MAJOR HISTORIC
PRESERVATION COURT DECISIONS
COMPILED BY STEPHEN N. DENNIS*

Ten years ago, when Bob Stipe wrote in the July 1970 issue of Preservation News' of the need for the occasional preservation court case to
be monitored closely so that the result could be distributed quickly to
city attorneys and others interested in land use issues, no one familiar
with the few preservation cases that already had been litigated would
have predicted the dramatic increase in the volume of preservation litigation that has occurred in only ten years. The following annotated list
of major historic preservation court decisions illustrates this growth.
Of the seventy-nine cases listed, only four were decided before 1950.
Although six cases were decided between 1950 and 1960 and ten more
cases were decided between 1960 and 1969, all but twenty of the seventy-nine cases listed have been decided since 1970. Thus, nearly three
times as many cases involving historic preservation issues have been
decided in the last ten years as in the seventy-four years between the
United States Supreme Court's 1896 opinion in United States v. Gettysburg Electric Railway Company2 and 1970.
The National Trust for Historic Preservation prepared this annotated
list of major historic preservation court decisions primarily for use by
-attorneys, whether they are city attorneys who need to remain informed
about developments in preservation law or private attorneys who can
expect to have preservation clients. It should be useful, however, to
local preservation commissions, to private preservation organizations,
and to persons concerned with the protection and preservation of significant buildings.
For each listed case, the National Trust maintains a file containing a
* Associate Chief Counsel, Landmarks & Preservation Law, Office of Real Estate & Legal
Services, National Trust for Historic Preservation. B.A., University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill; J.D., Duke University; Ph. D., Cornell University.
Earlier versions of this annotated list have been distributed by the National Trust for Historic
Preservation and have appeared in conference materials prepared for a Special Symposium at the
1979 Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association and for the Third Annual Governor's
Conference on Historic Preservation in 1979. A briefer version of the list appears at 12 URB. LAW.
87-101 (1980).
i. Stipe, PreservationLawyers-Unite!, Preservation News, July 1970, at 5, col. 1, reprintedin
II N.C. CENT. L.J. 208 (1980).
2. 160 U.S. 668 (1896).
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copy of the full opinion in the case, and often copies of the complaint
and briefs in the case. In addition to these seventy-nine major cases,
the National Trust's litigation files contain information about scores of
additional recent cases that did not result in significant decisions, were
dropped before decisions could be rendered, or are still pending. In
general, all cases decided before 1970 are listed.
Although a strong national historic preservation movement has developed in the thirty-one years since the creation of the National Trust
for Historic Preservation in 1949,1 much of the strength of the historic
preservation movement derives from local efforts in certain states. It is
useful, therefore, to consider the development of historic preservation
litigation in terms of the states in which preservation "situations" have
been litigated, whether in state courts under local ordinances and state
statutes or in federal courts under congressional enactments. States in
which there has been a significant amount of historic preservation litigation are likely to be states in which knowledgeable preservationists
are aware of the protections available to important buildings under
federal statutes and local ordinances, as well as states in which attorneys have become familiar with historic preservation law through experience with more than a single case.
As recently as 1960 a city attorney or law student wishing to learn
about historic preservation law might have concluded that it existed or
was being created primarily in Louisiana 4 or Massachusetts.' By 1970
the situation would not have appeared very different, except for the
addition of New York; 6 two additional preservation law cases were decided in Louisiana between 1960 and 1970. 7
Since 1970 preservation law has continued to develop in all three
states, with two additional cases in Louisiana,8 four additional cases in
Massachusetts, 9 and eight additional cases in New York."° There has
also been significant case development in California," Connecticut, 27
6
5
Maryland,' 3 Missouri,' 4 Pennsylvania,' Texas,' and Wisconsin.'
3.
408, 63
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
1i.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

16 U.S.C. §§ 468-468d (1976) (originally enacted as Act of Oct. 26, 1949, Pub. L. No. 81Stat. 927).
Cases 3, 4, 6, and 10 infra.
Cases 8 and 9 infra.
Cases 16 and 18 infra.
Cases 14 and 17 infra.
Cases 31 and 39 infra.
Cases 30, 40, 45, and 77 infra.
Cases 27, 28, 36, 48, 55, 56, 61, and 69 infra.
Cases 23, 43, and 71 infra.
Cases 37 and 73 infra.
Cases 5, 24, 47, and 78 infra.
Cases 21, 29, 52, and 79 infra.
Cases 1, 38, 50, 59, 64, and 73 infra.
Cases 25, 51, 60, and 70 infra.
Cases 7, 67, and 74 infra.
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There has been more limited development in Colorado,'" the District
of Columbia, 9 Hawaii,2" Illinois,2 Ohio,2 2 and Virginia.23
Although preservation court cases are now being brought throughout
the country, certain topics are litigated more frequently than others. By
far the largest number of listed cases involved local preservation ordinances or the actions of local24 preservatioi commissions-forty-one of
the seventy-nine listed cases.
Three cases involve property owners who wished to apply inappropriate siding to structures within local historic districts.2 Six cases involve churches that wished to demolish significant structures.26 Two
important buildings. 27
cases involve banks that wished to demolish
28
Seven cases involve HUD-funded projects.
In some areas there has been little preservation litigation to date.
Only one case on the list 29 deals with a preservation easement question
and only one case involves a tax question.3 ° Only three cases involve
the construction of wills or trust instruments affecting historic properties.3
From almost any viewpoint a major period of preservation litigation
came to its conclusion in Penn CentralTransportation Company v. City
of New York, 32 the United States Supreme Court's 1978 decision upholding against "taking" claims the validity of a landmark designation
of a large commercial building located in the heart of a major American metropolis. In the future there should be fewer attacks than there
have been in the past on the validity of local preservation ordinances
under state law or the designation of landmarks and historic districts
under such ordinances. Instead, future cases are likely to concentrate
on "reasonable return" questions and the adequacy of the procedures
used by local preservation commissions rather than on the decisions
they reach.3 3

18. Cases 44 and 62 infra.
19. Cases 33 and 46 infra.
20. Cases 32 and 52 infra.
21. Cases 19, 20, and 35 infra.
22. Cases 12 and 34 infra.
23. Cases 26 and 41 infra.
24. Cases 3, 4, 6, 8-11, 13-20, 22-24, 27, 30, 31, 37, 38, 40, 45, 47-50, 52, 55, 56, 61, 62, 69, 70,
73, 76-79 infra.
25. Cases 30, 40, and 78 infra.
26. Cases 27, 38, 48, 69, and 79 infra.
27. Cases 35 and 59 infra.
28. Cases 28, 44, 65, 66, 68, 69, 72, and 74 infra.
29. Case 53 infra.
30. Case 58 infra.
31. Cases 29, 34, and 43 infra.
32. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
33. Since Penn Central the Supreme Court has considered the "taking" issue in both Andrus
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The only North Carolina case included in the list is A-S-PAssociates
v. City of Raleigh,34 which, by upholding the validity of a local preservation ordinance, cleared up doubts about the validity of such ordinances that had stemmed from a 1964 opinion of the North Carolina
Attorney General.35 That opinion, given in response to a request from
a community considering the enactment of a preservation ordinance
for an opinion on the constitutionality of such an ordinance, stated that
"the municipality has no statutory authority to enact such an ordinance
and, further, it would be doubtful if the General Assembly of North
Carolina could grant a municipality the authority to enact such an ordinance since it is difficult for us to see that the establishment of the
Historic District bears any relationship to the public safety, health and
welfare as those words have been interpreted by our Supreme Court. 3 6
The North Carolina Supreme Court was careful to note in its first
footnote that "the constitutionality of historic district preservation is a
matter of first impression for this Court. 3' 7 The court pointed out in
the same footnote that although the City of Winston-Salem had created
the Old Salem Historic Preservation District in 1948, the North Carolina General Assembly did not enact, any enabling legislation permitting local historic districts until 1965.38 In A-S-P the court stated that it
found "no difficulty in holding that the police power encompasses the
right to control the exterior appearance of private property when the
object of such control is the preservation of the State's legacy of historically significant structures. ' 39 The A-S-P case is nationally important
because it involved the applicability of a preservation ordinance to a
vacant lot located at the edge of a local historic district.
It is clear that today attorneys with preservation clients have several
advantages that were not available to them as recently as only ten years
ago. The body of court precedents has expanded, information about
unreported or pending cases is more readily available, and many attorneys have developed an interest in historic preservation law.4 °
v. Allard, 100 S.Ct. 318 (1979), Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 383 (1979), and Aigens v.
City of Tiburon, 48 U.S.L.W. 4700 (June 10, 1980). In 41lard Justice Brennan reiterated the
interpretation of the fifth amendment's taking clause stated in Penn Central. NATIONAL TRUST
FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION, 5 LANDMARKS & HISTORIC DISTRICT COMMISSIONS, No. 1 (Feb.
1979). In Aigens, Justice Powell stated that ordinances intended to promote the retention of openspace within a community "substantially advanced legitimate governmental goals" because they
are "exercises of the city's police power to protect the residents ... from the ill-effects of urbanization."
34. 298 N.C. 207, 258 S.E.2d 444 (1979).
35. Op. Att'y Gen. (Apr. 7, 1964).
36.

Id.

37. 298 N.C. 207, n.1, 258 S.E.2d 444, n.l (1979).
38.

Id.

39. Id. at 216, 258 S.E.2d at 450.
40. See, e.g., Bonderman, Special Tactical ConsiderationsFrequently Arise When Litigating
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Information about pending or decided historic preservation cases is
available from the National Trust's Office of Real Estate and Legal
Services and the Trust's six regional offices in Boston, Washington,
Charleston, Chicago, Oklahoma City, and San Francisco. The Trust's
ten periodic litigation charts list a total of 195 cases since September
1975.

The attorneys involved in these cases and the law professors teaching
courses in historic preservation law employ a substantial body of developed and constantly-growing statutes and case law. In addition, staff
members in several hundred municipal law offices have some knowledge of historic preservation objectives and the court precedents because of their work in connection with the drafting of a local
preservation ordinance or the advice they are asked to render to a local
preservation commission. Finally, many attorneys give generously of
their time as members of local preservation commissions and add to
their effectiveness as commission members by expanding their knowledge of historic preservation law. This annotated list should assist
them in their endeavors:
United States v. Gettysburg Electric Railway, 160 U.S. 668 (1896).
Upheld propriety of use of eminent domain power by federal government to condemn and take historic properties.
2. Roe v. Kansas ex rel Smith, 278 U.S. 191 (1929). Upheld propriety of use of eminent domain power by state government to condemn and take historic properties.
3. City of New Orleans v Impastato, 198 La. 206, 3 So. 2d 559 (1941).
Upheld power of Vieux Carr6 Commission to regulate all exterior
changes to buildings in Vieux CarrY.
4. City of New Orleans v. Pergament, 198 La. 852, 5 So. 2d 129
(1941). Upheld power of Vieux Carr6 Commission to regulate
signs within Vieux Carr6.
5. Flaccomio v. Mayor of Baltimore, 194 Md. 275, 71 A.2d 12 (1950).
Upheld propriety of use of eminent domain by city government to
condemn and take historic properties.
6. City of New Orleans v. Levy, 223 La. 14, 64 So. 2d 798 (1953).
1.

Upheld constitutionality of Vieux Carr6 ordinance against attack
alleging vague standards, denial of equal protection, and use of
7.

police power for aesthetic purposes only.
State ex rel Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland (Fox Point),
269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955).

Upheld constitutionality of local ordinance requiring approval by
village building board of exterior architecture of proposed construction before issuing building permit. Preservation of property
PreservationLaw Controversies, Nat'l L.J., May 19, 1980, at 19, col. 1; Gilbert, PreservationLaw
Coming Into Its Own, Nat'l L.J., May 19, 1980, at 19, col. 4.
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values held proper objective for exercise of police power, and
standards in ordinance held adequate.
8. Opinion of the Justices to the Senate (Nantucket), 333 Mass. 773,
128 N.E.2d 557 (1955). Proposed state enabling legislation creating historic district commission for Nantucket held constitutional,
although in particular instances actions of commission might be
unconstitutional.
9. Opinion of the Justices to the Senate (Beacon Hill), 333 Mass. 783,
128 N.E.2d 563 (1955). Proposed state enabling legislation creating historic district commission for Beacon Hill held constitutional, and a number of commission's permissible powers
enumerated.
10. Whitty v. City of New Orleans, Civil No. 6367 (E.D. La. Oct. 21,
1959). Vieux Carr6 ordinance held constitutional, and denial of
demolition permit under that ordinance found not arbitrary or capricious and not to violate due process clause of United States and
Louisiana Constitutions. Vieux Carr6 Commission held to have
both legal and constitutional right to impose "reasonable conditions relative to replacement of. . . demolished structures before
granting a demolition permit."
11. Hayes v. Smith, 92 R.I. 173, 167 A.2d 546 (1961). Upheld zoning
board of review's reversal of decision by historic district commission to deny certificate of appropriateness for proposed addition
to structure within district on ground board may consider question de novo because it, but not commission, held required public
hearing on compatibility of proposed addition.
12. Reid v. Architectural Board of Review, 119 Ohio App. 67, 192
N.E.2d 74 (1963). Upheld board's denial of building permit for
proposed residence of modem design to be constructed in neighborhood composed of houses in traditional styles.
13. City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 73 N.M. 410, 389 P.2d
13 (1964). Santa Fe historic district ordinance regulating window
sizes as one detail of defined historic architectural style upheld
under general grant of zoning power to city from state although
no specific state enabling legislation permits municipalities to create historic districts. Ordinance held to contain adequate standards and not to be denial of equal protection.
14. Vieux Carre Property Owners and Associates, Inc. v. City of New
Orleans, 246 La. 788, 167 So. 2d 367 (1964). Affirmed New Orleans' trust obligation, created by constitutional amendment, to protect entire area within Vieux Carrt and held constitutional 1946
amendment to Vieux Carrt ordinance exempting specified area
within Vieux Carr6 from jurisdiction of Vieux Carrt Commission.
15. Town of Deeringex rel Bittenbender v. Tibbetts, 105 N.H. 481, 202
A.2d 232 (1964). Local ordinance permitting town selectmen to
approve or disapprove planned new construction within one-

https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol11/iss2/13

6

Dennis: An Annotated List of Major Historic Preservation Court Decisions
HISTORIC COURT DECISIONS
fourth mile of town common upheld as valid exercise of police
power under state statute permitting town to enact by-laws to protect common. Criterion of ordinance that "atmosphere" of town
is to be considered by selectmen held' acceptable.
16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

Manhattan Club v. Landmarks Preservation Commission, 51 Misc.
2d 556, 273 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1966). Designation of building as
landmark held not confiscatory when owner guaranteed reasonable return on investment with option to demolish building if no
scheme to provide such reasonable return can be devised.
State ex rel Phillips v. Board of Zoning Adjustments, 197 So. 2d
916 (La. 1967). Mere location of property within Vieux CarrY,
such property consequently being subject to both Vieux Carri ordinance and general zoning ordinance, insufficient to constitute
hardship justifying grant of variance to permit construction of additional structure on lot containing single main building; that both
adjoining lots contain two main buildings and that many other
lots in Vieux Carr also contain two main buildings are facts that
must have been considered by drafters of Vieux Carr ordinance
and do not justify grant of variance.
Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Platt, 29 A.D.2d 376, 288
N.Y.S.2d 314 (1968). Constitutionality of municipal landmarks
ordinance upheld; whether designation as landmark of building
owned by charitable organization constitutes taking held to depend on whether (1) preservation of building would seriously interfere with use of property, (2) building capable of conversion to
useful purpose without excessive cost, and (3) cost of maintaining
it without use would entail serious expenditure.
Rebman v. City ofSpringfield, 111 Ill. App. 2d 430, 250 N.E.2d 282
(1969). Zoning ordinance placing property in historic district held
not a taking, and ordinance held valid exercise of police power for
zoning purposes; denial of building permit appropriate under ordinance because proposed construction not in keeping with historic area surrounding Lincoln Home.
M & N Enterfprises v. City of Springfield, 111 Ill. App. 2d 444, 250
N.E.2d 289 (1969). State enabling legislation to permit establishment of historic districts held to have created new concept of public welfare permitting exercise of police power to protect historical
areas; zoning ordinance for historic preservation that increases
value of properties because of their proximity to historic structure
held not confiscatory or unreasonable if it also limits properties to
noncommercial uses.
State ex rel Stoyanoff v. Berkeley, 458 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1970).
Upheld architectural board's denial of building permit for modernistic home to be constructed in area containing homes in traditional styles because permit denial promotes general welfare of
community and preserves property values.
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Hall v. Village of Franklin, No. 69-52580 (Oakland County Cir.
Ct., Mich. Feb. 10, 1972). State enabling legislation to permit
municipalities to create historic districts upheld as proper exercise
of police power, and local municipality held to have acted reasonably in creating historic district, but zoning change of plaintiffs
property from commercial to residential held confiscatory.
23. Bohannan v. City of San Diego, 30 Cal. App. 3d 416, 106 Cal.
Rptr. 333 (1973). Historic district ordinance requiring new construction and alterations to existing buildings to use materials and
styles "in general accord with the appearance of the structures
built in Old San Diego prior to 1871" held a valid exercise of police power because criteria included within ordinance.
24. Mayor of Annapolis v. Anne Arundel County, 271 Md. 265, 316
A.2d 807 (1974). County held subject to jurisdiction of municipal
historic district commission with regard to county-owned building
within municipal historic district; historic district commission's
denial of demolition permit upheld because supported by substantial weight of evidence; county held to have offered no proof of
hardship to justify demolition.
25. City of Dallas v. Crownrich, 506 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
Upheld authority of municipality to use its police power to impose
moratorium on issuance of building permits pending action on
designation of proposed historic district even though application
for building permit made before moratorium imposed.
26. Ely v. Velde, 497 F.2d 252 (4th Cir. 1974). State which had
planned to use LEAA funds to construct prison facility near National Register houses must either comply with both National Environmental Policy Act and National Historic Preservation Act or
reimburse federal government for sums initially allocated to proposed facility but diverted to other state projects.
27. Lutheran Church in America v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d 121,
316 N.E.2d 305, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974). Designation of property
owned by charitable organization held confiscatory because designated building inadequate for owner's needs; demonstration of economic or other hardship held sufficient for successful challenge
to landmark designation.
28. Save the Courthouse Committee v. Lynn, 408 F. Supp. 1323
(S.D.N.Y. 1975). Granted injunction to prevent demolition of
courthouse listed on National Register of Historic Places and included within urban renewal project area because HUD (1) failed
to comply with HUD regulations governing review of its projects
affecting National Register properties, and (2) failed to complete
adequate environmental impact statement for project as required
by the National Environmental Policy Act; injunction applicable
to both HUD and local urban renewal agency.
29. Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co., 524 S.W.2d 210 (Mo. App.
22.
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30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

36.

1975). Testamentary provision directing demolition of home of
testatrix on private street locally designated as landmark held void
as violation of public policy.
Forg v. Jaquith, No. 35391 (Middlesex Super. Ct., Mass. July 22,
1975). Upheld historic district commission's denial of certificate
of appropriateness for installation of vinyl siding and shutters on
house fronting on Lexington Battle Green within historic district.
Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 905 (1975). Upheld constitutionality of Vieux
Carr6 ordinance creating historic district; ordinance held to contain adequate standards to guide decisions of Vieux Carr6 Commission; denial of demolition permit under ordinance held
insufficient to constitute taking; ordinance provision requiring
minimum maintenance held constitutional although as applied in
individual circumstances it might constitute taking.
Stop H-3 Association v. Coleman, 533 F.2d 434 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Wright v. Stop H-3Association, 429 U.S. 999 (1976).
Determination by Secretary of Interior that site "may be eligible"
for National Register because of local significance triggers protections of section 4(f) of Department of Transportation Act, despite
determination by state board that site has only "marginal" local
significance; construction of highway enjoined until Secretary of
Transportation complies with section 4(f).
Dupont Circle Citizens Association v. District of Columbia Zoning
Commission, 355 A.2d 550 (D.C. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
966 (1976). Upheld decision of zoning commission to approve
planned unit development application involving transfer of development rights for Christian Heurich Mansion.
National City Bank v. Case Western Reserve University, No. 29349
(Lorain County C.P., Ohio Mar. 1976). Despite testamentary direction to executors to raze home of testatrix, listed in National
Register, executors permitted to sell house with deed restriction
forbidding its use or conversion for commercial purposes.
Edwards v. First Bank of Dundee, 534 F.2d 1242 (7th Cir. 1976).
Dismissed action seeking injunction to prevent bank from demolishing building within National Register historic district because
of lack of involvement of federal money in proposed demolition
and failure of plaintiffs to join as party defendant any federal officer with federal responsibilities.
FredF French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587,
350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, cert. denied,429 U.S. 990 (1976).
Amendment to New York zoning resolution that created "Special
Park District," rezoned two private parks as public parks, and
granted to property owners transferable development rights declared unconstitutional because of lack of certainty development
rights could or would be used elsewhere. In dictum, court ap-
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39.
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proved schemes to separate development rights from properties
when compensation paid for development rights at time of their
separation.
Figarsky v. HistoricDistrict Commission, 171 Conn. 198, 368 A.2d
163 (1976). Local ordinance creating historic district found constitutional; denial of certificate of appropriateness for requested
demolition permit upheld, in part because plaintiffs presented no
evidence justifying hardship relief.
First Presbyterian Church of York v. City Council, 25 P. Commw.
Ct. 154, 360 A.2d 257 (1976). Denial by historic district commission of certificate of appropriateness for demolition by church of
house listed in National Register upheld because church failed to
prove that denial of demolition permit precluded use of house for
any purpose for which it is reasonably adapted.
City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976). Ordinance
prohibiting operation in Vieux Carr6 of pushcarts selling foodstuffs unless vendors had been in operation in Vieux Carr6 at least
eight years found constitutionally permissible economic regulation. Court noted ordinance's objective had been "to preserve the
appearance and custom valued by the Quarter's residents and attractive to tourists"; the unanimous opinion stated that the "legitimacy of that objective is obvious."
Walerzak v. Gagnon, No. LE-65 1-S-76T (Hampden County Housing Ct., Mass. Nov. 19, 1976). Denial by Springfield Historical
Commission of certificate of appropriateness for application of
aluminum siding to house in locally-designated historic district
now partially covered by shaped shingles held a valid exercise of
police power to protect "a unique example of early suburban
(Shingle Style) single family residential development."
Virginia Historic Landmarks Commission v. Board of Supervisors,
217 Va. 506, 230 S.E.2d 449 (1976). Commission's identification
(not designation) of potential 14,000-acre rural historic district
held a "horatory act" that "did not determine any property rights
of the landowners in the district."
City of Louisville v. Woman's Club, No. 76-2398 (Ky. Sup. Ct.
Dec. 17, 1976). Trial court erred in dismissing city's condemnation action; constitutionality of Louisville landmarks ordinance
held not relevant to city's planned use of eminent domain power
to condemn property for historic preservation.
Estate of Frances M Molera, No. 186019 (San Fran. County
Super. Ct., Cal. Jan. 3, 1977). Testamentary trust directing trustee
to raze barn contemporary with historic structure modified to permit retention and maintenance of barn in light of lessee's wish to
restore barn and city's reluctance to permit barn's demolition.
Hart v. Denver Urban RenewalAuthority, 551 F.2d 1178 (10th Cir.
1977). Affirmed injunction precluding sale by local urban renewal
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authority of National Register structure until compliance by
HUD with HUD regulations and NEPA, in part because of
HUD's continuing involvement with project under section 108 of
Loan and Grant Contract.
45.

Gumley v. Board of Selectmen, 371 Mass. 718, 358 N.E.2d 1011
(1977). Standard of review to be used by court hearing appeal
from historic district commission is similar to that used for reviewing grant or denial of special zoning permits. Court affirmed
annullment of historic district commission's decision, but reversed
order that certificates of appropriateness must be issued. Court
held it proper for Nantucket historic district commission to consider length of new buildings. Court held that zoning board of
appeals cannot reverse historic district commission decision "unless it is based on a legally untenable ground, or is unreasonable,
whimsical, capricious or arbitrary."

46.

Dunbar High School Alumni Association v. Department of Housing
and Community Development, Civ. No. 8911-76 (D.C. Super. Ct.
Apr. 1, 1977). Portion of former preservation ordinance permitting 180-day demolition delay period held to require "meaningful
negotiations" during delay period among building owner, civic
groups, public agencies, interested citizens, and State Historic
Preservation Officer.

47.

Annapolis Emergency Hospital Association v. Annapolis Historic
District Commission, No. D-962 (Anne Arundel County Cir. Ct.
Apr. 14, 1977). Decision of historic district commission reversed
because applicant was denied procedural due process when commission chairman, who had long been associated as both member
and/or officer with local private preservation organization publicly opposed to granting of application, refused to disqualify herself from voting on application.

48.

St. James United Methodist Church, Inc. v. City of Kingston,
(Ulster County Sup. Ct., N.Y. May 6, 1977). Designation of local
church structure as landmark invalidated because notice requirement of local preservation ordinance had not been met when
structure was designated.

49.

Lafayette Park Baptist Church v. Scott, 553 S.W.2d 586 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1977). Church which acquired at foreclosure sale property
within locally-designated historic district held to have had constructive notice of property's location in historic district. Court
held that "it is necessary that the standards established governing
demolition in a historic district take into account the economic
impact upon a given parcel where demolition is sought" and that
demolition must therefore be permitted if condition of building is
such that economics of restoration would preclude owner from
making reasonable use of its property. Court held owner would
be protected if it could sell property for "reasonable value without
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regard to the non-demolition features of the ordinance." (See
case 79 infra for result on appeal.)
50. B.P.Oil, Inc. v. City of Harrisburg,No. 2059 (Dauphin County
C.P., Pa. June 13, 1977). Upheld decision by city council, acting
on recommendation of Board of Historical and Architectural Review, to deny demolition permits for several structures within locally-designated historic district because owner of structures
"failed to sustain its burden of showing conclusively that these
• . .properties could not be used for rentals, nor does the record
indicate any attempt to sell."
51. Texas Antiquities Committee v. Dallas County Community College
District, 554 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. 1977). Section 6 of Texas Antiquities Code, pursuant to which Antiquities Committee had denied
demolition permits for several buildings, held unconstitutionally
vague because it contains no standards for use by Antiquities
Committee in identifying structures of historical significance.
Court found no substantial evidence to support decision of Antiquities Committee because restoration of structures would involve
improper diversion of school district funds committed to public
purpose and unreasonable expenditures of money would be required to restore buildings that even after restoration could not be
used for educational purposes. Dissent argued that majority opinion "is tantamount to a judicial declaration that no property held
by a political subdivision can be protected under the legislative
banner of historical preservation unless the property originally
was acquired for its aesthetic characteristics, or unless the Legislature takes the property by exercise of eminent domain."
52. Dempsey v. Boys' Club, 558 S.W.2d 262 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
Board of Adjustment decision to grant demolition permits reversed because record did not contain substantial evidence of economic feasibility or infeasibility of rehabilitating nine structures
within locally-designated historic district.
53. A/uli v. Brown, 437 F. Supp. 602 (D. Hawaii 1977). Aerial and
surface bombardment of Kahoolawe Island held to be for NEPA
purposes a major federal action significantly affecting quality of
human environment, and defendants held under obligation to
prepare new environmental impact statements (EIS) because of
discovery of additional archeological sites on island. Defendants
ordered to file EIS annually as long as they continue to bomb Kahoolawe. Court found that private right of action to enforce Executive Order 11593 can be implied to effectuate purpose of
executive order and National Historic Preservation Act. Defendants found in violation of Executive Order 11593 and ordered to
begin nominating known archeological sites to National Register
before completion of survey of entire island and to request from
Secretary of the Interior determination of eligibility of Kahoolawe
as island to National Register.
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Thayer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1977-370 (Oct. 25, 1977).
Court determined that value of open-space or scenic easement
over sixty-acre estate near Gunston Hall outside Washington,
D.C. was between appraisal valuations provided by appraiser for
Virginia Division of Conservation and Economic Development
(valuation used by petitioner) and appraiser for Internal Revenue
Service. Easement had been donated to Virginia Outdoors Foundation. Court noted with approval that both appraisers had used
"before and after approach" of Rev. Rul. 73-339 in determining
value of scenic easement, but emphasized that appraiser for Virginia state agency "did not prepare a written appraisal report"
and probably did not "go through all of the detailed appraisal
procedures" used by the IRS appraiser, so that "he relied to some
extent on his general knowledge of the subject and surrounding
properties in determining the highest and best use of Overlook
Farm before and after easement and the values to be assigned
thereto." Court determined values of farm before and after granting of easement.
55. Zartman v. Reisem, 59 A.D.2d 237, 399 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1977). Decision of Rochester Preservation Board to permit construction of
tennis court in backyard of residential property within locally-designated historic district upheld over opposition of adjoining property owners because Board's decision was based on sufficient
evidence and was consistent with values municipality sought to
preserve when it designated historic district. Court also held that
notice claim of adjoining property owners was not of constitutional dimension.
56. Equitable Funding Corp. v. Spatt, No. 12832/77 (Kings County
Sup. Ct., N.Y. Feb. 8, 1978). New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission held to have violated New York City
Landmarks Preservation Ordinance by failing to give reasons for
denial of requested certificate of appropriateness for structure
within locally-designated historic district. Matter remanded to
commission for reconsideration of possible blighting effect of
structure on historic district containing it.
57. Hall County Historical Society v. Georgia Department of Transportation, 447 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ga. 1978). Injunctive relief
granted to prevent continuation of federally-funded highway
widening project into National Register historic district because
Federal Highway Administration improperly delegated to state
highway officials its responsibilities under National Historic Preservation Act and "failed to undertake any independent studies,
reports, or evaluations of the project's potential environmental effects." Court also held that National Historic Preservation Act
"requires that the determinations of effect, adverse effect, or no
effect by the appropriate federal agency official be an independent
one, and not simply a 'rubber stamp' of the state's work."
54.
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58.

Historic House Museum Corp. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. No. 2
(Apr. 5, 1978). Petitioner held to have deducted improperly certain taxes and maintenance expenses when computing "net investment income" for four-percent excise tax imposed by I.R.C.
section 4940(a). Petitioner is private foundation maintaining a
historic house, and whose sole income is interest in connection
with which there are no expenses. Petitioner had expended, in
taxable years at issue, amounts in excess of its interest income for
maintenance expenses and taxes, claimed deductions for such
items, and reported no excise tax due. Court held "that there is no
evidence that any of the expenses which petitioner seeks to deduct
is in any way related to the possibility of earning future income by
way of 'interest, dividends, rents, and royalties.' . . . Potential admission fees do not fall within any of these categories."
59. Weintraub v. ProvidentNationalBank, No. 78-1577 (E.D. Pa. May
11, 1978). Held policy of National Banking Act "infused with a
new dimension" by National Historic Preservation Act so that
when arguable case can be made that branch bank is changing its
location, Comptroller of the Currency has authority under National Banking Act to approve change of location and responsibility under National Historic Preservation Act to seek comments of
Advisory Council before doing so. Temporary restraining order
granted.
60. Crownrich v. City of Dallas,No. CA-3-76-1080-G (N.D. Tex. May
25, 1978). Loss to plaintiff caused by imposition of allegedly restrictive zoning and enactment of preservation ordinance that prohibited plaintiff's construction of highrise apartment building
within local historic district held "not of the type requiring compensation." Court noted that "many zoning changes present numerous losses of the type suffered by Crownrich. These losses fall
into that category of risks of investment to be suffered by the entrepreneur, not all taxpayers. To do otherwise would make land
investment a one-way street in the sense that many zoning
changes increase the value of property, an enhancement the investor takes for himself."
61. Penn CentralTransportationCo. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104
(1978). Designation of Grand Central Terminal as landmark
structure by New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission
and denial of certificate of appropriateness for construction of
fifty-five story office tower on Terminal site held not a taking because "[tihe restrictions imposed are substantially related to the
promotion of the general welfare and not only permit reasonable
beneficial use of the landmark site but afford appellants opportunities further to enhance not only the Terminal site proper but
also other properties."
62. South of Second Associates v. Town of Georgetown, 580 P.2d 807
(Colo. 1978). Local preservation ordinances found unconstitu-
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tionally vague because of their failure to define the differently
classified "areas" within a community-wide historic district, in
light of fact local preservation commission was empowered to
consider effect of proposed new construction or alteration on
"general historical and/or architectural character of the structure
or area."
63. Hoboken Environment Committee, Inc. v. German Seaman's Mission, 161 N.J. Super. 256, 391 A.2d 577 (1978). Despite listing of
Mission structure in New Jersey Register of Historic Places and
nomination of Mission to National Register of Historic Places,
court found no basis to restrain demolition of Mission by private
owner when no federal, state, or local action to compel building's
preservation could be anticipated. Court held that issuance of
demolition permit would not constitute a prohibited municipal
project under New Jersey Environment Rights Act and noted that
Hoboken preservation .ordinance contains exemption for building
permits issued prior to effective date of ordinance (enacted after
issuance of demolition permit for Mission).
64. Weintraub v. Rural ElectrificationAdministration, 457 F. Supp. 78
(D. Pa. 1978). Remote effect of federal spending held not sufficient to trigger section 106 of National Historic Preservation Act.
Congress, in court's view, only intended to control direct federal
spending for actions or projects which would otherwise destroy
buildings in National Register. Congress did not intend to reach
every effect of federal spending. Court further concluded that "license" in section 106 must be given limited definition: "Congress
did not intend to affect every action which required federal approval. Consequently, the Court concludes that the regulation of
REA, which requires approval of headquarters buildings and
their adjuncts, does not provide for a license within the meaning
of 16 U.S.C. § 470f. For the reasons indicated above, the Court is
also of the view that the right of REA to approve and control the
expenditure of surplus funds of the electric cooperatives which
compose AEC does not relate to a license within the meaning of
16 U.S.C. § 470f."
65. Citizens Defense Fund v. Gallagher, No. Cv. 78-63-Bu (D. Mont.
Nov. 3, 1978). HUD's National Historic Preservation Act responsibilities held non-delegable to funding applicant. Court held that
notification to HUD by Department of Interior that properties
within a project area might be eligible for National Register listing "triggered the responsibility of defendants to comply with the
laws on historic preservation. These laws and regulations must be
complied with as long as it is still possible to do so."
66. Wisconsin Heritages,Inc. v. Harris,460 F. Supp. 1120 (E.D. Wis.
1978). HUD held to have obligation under NEPA (but not under
National Historic Preservation Act, Executive Order 11593, or
HUD's own regulations) to consider relocation alternatives to
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demolition of Richardsonian-Romanesque Edith Plankinton
Mansion in area of federally-funded urban renewal project in
Milwaukee. Court held that "HUD retained sufficient control
over the expenditure of funds under the project feasibly to make a
study of the mansion's demolition and to consider alternatives,"
although court noted that contractual right of Marquette University to acquire site cleared of improvements may preclude HUD
from considering as a NEPA alternative "the retention of the
mansion at its present site."
67. State ex rel Associationfor Preservationof Tennessee Antiquities v.
City of Jackson, 573 S.W.2d 750 (Tenn. 1978). Upheld lease by
city to private corporation of National Register property in light
of consistent deficits city had run in attempting to operate property as museum and because lease agreement adequately protected city's interest. Court declined to decide case solely on
question of whether city owned property in "proprietary" or "governmental" capacity.
68. Central Oklahoma Preservation Alliance, Inc. v. Oklahoma City
Urban Renewal Authority, 471 F. Supp. 68 (W.D. Okla. 1979).
Determination by Keeper of National Register that a building is
eligible for the National Register held to impose no new duties on
HUD when "[e]ven the routine, ministerial, and perfunctory
clearances and approvals required under the contract and HUD
procedures with respect to the redevelopment site" in which the
building in question was located had occurred prior to notification
of HUD by Keeper of National Register.
69. Society of Ethical Culture v. Spatt, 68 A.D.2d 112, 416 N.Y.S.2d
246 (1979). Court held that "rational basis" test must be used in
reviewing New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission's
designation of Art Nouveau Meeting House of Society for Ethical
Culture as landmark, and noted that trial court had improperly
made "a subjective substitution of its judgment for that of the
Commission's historians and architects." Court stated: "If the
preservation of landmarks were limited to only that which has extraordinary distinction or enjoys popular appeal, much of what is
rare and precious in our architectural and historical heritage
would soon disappear. It is the function of the Landmarks Preservation Commission to ensure the continued existence of those
landmarks which lack the widespread appeal to preserve themselves." Court found no taking because "the only hardship upon
the Society is speculative upon a prospective use of the property,
i.e. large scale development and the revenues to accrue therefrom"
and that "no interference with a hitherto existing charitable purpose or function will result from landmark designation." Court
noted "there is no evidence that the property was ever purchased
for investment purposes." Court stated: "In the final analysis, obsolescence should be measured by the Society's needs, not on the
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prospects for development of a valuable place of property." Court
held that "the restriction here involved cannot be deemed an
abridgement of any first amendment freedom, particuarly when
the contemplated use, or a large part of it, is wholly unrelated to
the exercise of religion, except for the tangential benefit of raising
revenue through development." (Appeal pending.)
70.

Southern National Bank v. City of Austin, 582 S.W.2d 229 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1979). Held portion of Austin preservation ordinance
invalid that extended to any property placed on agenda of preservation commission for consideration as possible landmark those
protections to which actually designated landmarks would be entitled, because of lack of reasonable time limit during which city
council must decide whether to designate property as landmark,
and because of lack of standards to guide those empowered to
place properties on commission's agenda for landmark consideration. Additionally, court held that placement of property on commission's agenda amounts to imposition of servitude on property
and is a damaging of property for public use without adequate
compensation.

71.

Young v. Mellon, 156 Cal. Rptr. 165 (Ct. App. 1979). California
State Historic Preservation Officer held to have discretion in
choosing whether to approve recommendation by state Historic
Resources Commission of nomination to National Register of
Historic Places. Court held that "architectural and historical
characteristics of a building must be weighed against its societal
functions and the significance of its preservation in human terms."
(On August 29, 1979, California Supreme Court directed Reporter
of Decisions not to publish opinion in Official Reports).

72.

WA TCH (Waterbury Action to Conserve Our Heritage, Inc.) v.
Harris, 603 F.2d 310 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sum nom. Waterbury
Urban RenewalAgency v. WATCH, 100 S. Ct. 530 (1979). HUD
held to have continuing responsibilities under section 106 of the
National Historic Preservation Act for federally-funded urban renewal projects. Court held that date of signing of Loan and Capital Grant Contract is not, as determined by earlier courts, the
"cut-off' point for National Register properties, but that buildings
determined after date of Contract's signing to be eligible for Register listing are also entitled to protections of section 106. Court
stated that the mandate of the National Historic Preservation Act
is "quite broad," so that the court was "no more willing to give a
'crabbed interpretation' of section 106 of the Act than the courts
have been in respect to NEPA."

73.

Cleckner v. City of Harrisburg,101 Dauph. 134 (1979). Denial of
demolition permission for dilapidated structures in local historic
district held not a taking because owner failed to prove his inability to sell structures at fair market value. Property owner did not
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offer buildings for sale through real estate broker or advertise
them in a local newspaper, and set inflated sales prices.
74. Wisconsin Heritages, Inc. v. Harris, 476 F. Supp. 300 (E.D. Wis.
1979). Court granted in part motion to alter previously issued
preliminary injunction. In light of HUD's selection in Final Environmental Impact Statement of alternative of "No Federal Action," and in light of pending efforts to arrange for relocation of
Edith Plankinton Mansion, court agreed that if (1) parties contract
by March 1, 1980, for removal of mansion by August 1, preliminary injunction will terminate when mansion is removed; but if
(2) contracts for removal of mansion have not been entered into
by March 1, preliminary injunction will terminate on that date.
Court denied request that Wisconsin Heritages post bond during
pendency of preliminary injunction: "The plaintiff in this case is a
nonprofit organization with no apparent financial stake in the outcome of this suit. If it were forced to post thousands of dollars in
security, it would be effectively deterred from bringing this sort of
action. Such deterrence would contravene Congress' intention
that groups such as the plaintiff bring actions to aid in the enforcement of national environmental policy."
75. Barcelo v. Brown, 478 F. Supp. 646 (1979). Complaint sought to
enjoin United States Navy from continuing its use of Navy-owned
land on Puerto Rican island of Vieques and from use of waters
surrounding island for naval training operations. Court ordered
Navy to seek a National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) permit for release or firing of ordnance into the waters
of Vieques; to nominate to Secretary of the Interior sites eligible
for listing in the National Register, to seek determinations of eligibility for other sites, and to "take appropriate action for the protection of any such prospective sites pending decision as to their
eligibility"; and to comply with NEPA by filing an environmental
impact statement. Total opinion is 118 pages long, and historic
preservation portion of case is covered briefly in opinion.
76. A-S-P Associates v. City of Raleigh, 298 N.C. 207, 258 S.E.2d 444
(1979). In case of first impression in North Carolina, court upheld
constitutionality of Oakwood Historic District, an overlay zoning
district in Raleigh. Court found "no difficulty in holding that the
police power encompasses the right to control the exterior appearance of private property when the object of such control is the
preservation of the State's legacy of historically significant structures." Court noted wide recognition "that preservation of the
historic aspects of a district requires more than simply the preservation of those buildings of historical and architectural significance within the district," so that new construction as well as
existing buildings can be regulated. Court stated that although a
North Carolina municipality "has unlimited discretion to determine whether or not to establish a historic district or districts," if it
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establishes a district, "its discretion insofar as the method and the
standard by which a historic district ordinance is to be administered is, by contrast, extremely limited." Court stated that "a general, yet meaningful, contextual standard has been set forth to
limit the discretion of the Historic District Commission" because
general standard of "incongruity" is meaningful, given fact that
the characteristics of Victorian architecture, the "predominant architectural style" in the district, are "readily identifiable." Court
therefore upheld lower court's holding that Oakwood Ordinance
does not impermissibly delegate legislative power to historic district commission. Court held that City of Raleigh had not engaged in spot zoning in designating Oakwood district. Court
upheld lower court holding that inclusion of vacant lot owned by
petitioners within historic district and exclusion of adjacent lots
owned by State Medical Society did not deny petitioners equal
protection, noting that "legislative bodies may make rational distinctions with substantially less than mathematical exactitude."
77.

Sleeper v. Bourne, No. 216 (Mass. App. Div. Jan. 10, 1980). Court
upheld trial court opinion affirming preservation commission's denial of certificate of appropriateness for erection within historic
district of sixty-eight foot radio antenna on residential property.
Court held Sleeper suffered no particular hardship and that federal broadcasting statutes did not preempt state regulation of
property rights. Court found no taking because "Sleeper has not
demonstrated that the application of the Statute as to him has diminished to any degree the value of his property as a residence"
and because the local preservation commission "has not taken the
position that it would not approve any sort of communications
tower anywhere in the region." Court held that mandate of preservation ordinance "is not that one type [of architecture] be preserved to the exclusion of the other, but that the cultural heritage
in its entirety be preserved from encroachments by incongruous
structures" and that commission therefore need not have made
specific findings as to early appearance of area containing
Sleeper's property. Court suggested "a balancing of the competing interests of the individual seeking to use his property in a
manner which might offend the purposes of the Statute and that of
the inhabitants of the region to enjoy unimpaired the heritage of
the area." Court also suggested that commission should "include
in its decision specific findings of fact on the issue of substantial
hardship . . . whether or not the issue is specifically raised by an
applicant." Court held that "the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech does not require that the Town Committee award
Sleeper a certificate of appropriateness for a radio tower."

78.

Fout v. Frederick Historic District Commission, Misc. No. 4005
(Frederick County Cir. Ct., Md. Feb. 5, 1980). Court remanded to
local preservation commission consideration of application for
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certificate of appropriateness to install redwood siding over brick
facade of residence in local historic district. Court noted that
commission's initial denial of permission was not explained: "The
record must disclose the facts on which the Commission acted and
a statement of the reasons for its action. Without such a record
the reviewing court cannot perform its duty of determining
whether the action of the Commission was arbitrary or capricious." Court stated that Maryland enabling legislation for local
preservation commissions "was not a carte blanche authorization"
but limited counties and cities "to certain guidelines set forth in
the legislation." Under Maryland legislation, a local preservation
commission "must be strict in its judgment of plans of those structures deemed to be valuable according to studies and lenient in its
judgment of plans of structures of little historic value." Court
noted disapprovingly that record in the case was "completely void
of any reference to the historic or architectural value of the subject
property. There is no indication that the Commission used a strict
or lenient approach to its decision. Certainly not every structure
in the historic district has historic or architectural value. There
must be a finding of fact to that effect and that finding must be
spread upon the record and supported by evidence." Court noted
that commission must consider "economic impact on the owner
• . . as well as the best interest of the majority of the persons in
the community." Court stated that although commission members must be "qualified by public interest, knowledge or training
in such fields as history, architectural preservation or urban design" the commission members may not "apply their own expertise in granting or refusing exterior structural change." Court
noted disapprovingly that commission decisions had been based
in part on report submitted to commission by individual who "did
not testify concerning his report nor was he ever qualified on the
record as an expert." Court stated that although "[i]t is quite
proper for the Commission to act informally in arriving at their
decision,. . . the decision of the Commission should be a formal
writing setting forth the factors which it considered, the evidence
in support thereof and the reasons for its decision."

79.

Lafayette Park Baptist Church v. Board of Adjustment, No. 41816
(Mo. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 1980). Upheld trial court decision sustaining denial of demolition application. (See case 49 supra).
Court stated that incorporation by reference of standards contained in other documents does not give rise to constitutional violation. Court upheld challenged standards in St. Louis
preservation ordinance against vagueness claim because in earlier
cases [See cases 49 and 52 supra] Court has "interpreted the standards which, although loosely written, were fashioned by this interpretation into a cohesive and understandable set of rules."
Court noted "reasoning generally applied in historic district dem-
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olition cases to the effect the landowner must not only establish
that he can not economically utilize the property but that it is impractical to sell or lease it or that no market exists for it at a reasonable price." Court held that church, as applicant for permit,
had burden of proof and failed to show that property could not be
economically productive.
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